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NEW FORMS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RIGHTS- AND 
DEMOCRACY-BASED WORRIES 
Mark Tushnet* 
Recent developments in judicial review have raised the 
possibility that the debate over judicial supremacy versus 
legislative supremacy might be transformed into one about 
differing institutions to implement judicial review. Rather 
than posing judicial review against legislative supremacy, the 
terms of the debate might be over having institutions designed 
to exercise forms of judicial review that accommodate both 
legislative supremacy and judicial implementation of 
constitutional limits. After examining some of these 
institutional developments in Canada, South Africa, and Great 
Britain, this Article asks whether these accommodations, which 
attempt to pursue a middle course, have characteristic 
instabilities that will in the long run lead constitutional 
systems back to wither judicial or legislative supremacy. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Two models of constitutionalism were on offer in the last 
century. One was the so-called Westminster model of parliamentary 
supremacy, in which democratically elected legislatures had power 
unconstrained by anything other than the cultural presuppositions 
embedded in a majority's will. 1 The other was the United States 
(''U.S.'') model of constrained parliamentarianism, as Bruce 
Ackerman has labeled it.2 In this model, the legislature's powers are 
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center. 
1. These presuppositions could be unwritten, as in Great Britain, or 
written into a constitution that could serve as a reference point for political 
debate about whether a particular proposal was consistent with the culture's 
presuppositions. 
2. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
633, 664-87 (2000) (describing some components of some systems of constrained 
parliamentarianism). I use the somewhat more graceful term parliamentarism 
here. 
813 
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limited by the terms of a written constitution that courts will 
enforce. Each model promoted some values of liberal 
constitutionalism and raised worries about others. The 
Westminster model maximally advanced democratic self-
governance, but made it possible for empowered democratic 
majorities to violate rights that liberal systems should protect. The 
U.S. model gave the courts a wide-ranging power to invalidate 
legislation on the ground that the legislation violated those rights, 
but made it possible for reckless courts to interfere needlessly with 
policy choices democratic majorities should be allowed to make. 
For all practical purposes, the Westminster model has been 
withdrawn from sale. This Article examines some aspects of the 
situation that have resulted. Do the versions of liberal 
constitutionalism presently available do an acceptable job of 
reconciling empowered democracy with protected rights? First, I 
describe what I call strong-form judicial review, for which the 
United States provides the primary example. Strong-form judicial 
review generated a set of debates over judicial activism and judicial 
restraint, which threaten to reproduce themselves in newer systems 
of constrained parliamentarism. Following the example of Professor 
Kent Roach, I point out that it would be a large mistake to structure 
debates in some of the newer systems around the terms activism 
and restraint, because some of these newer systems adopt what I 
call weak-form judicial review.3 Weak-form systems hold out the 
promise of protecting liberal rights in a form that reduces the risk of 
wrongful interference with democratic self-governance. After 
describing several types of weak-form review, I raise some questions 
about the stability of weak-form judicial review as a version of 
constrained parliamentarism.4 My most important points are that 
weak-form judicial review may degenerate into a return to 
parliamentary supremacy or escalate into strong-form review, and 
3. One might say that weak-form systems of judicial review are, by 
definition, systems that design the institution of judicial review so that courts 
are necessarily restrained, whereas in strong-form systems restraint results 
from choices made by the judges themselves. I think this formulation is a bit 
misleading, though, because judges in some weak-form systems can choose to be 
as "activist" as judges in strong-form systems; weak-form systems differ from 
strong-form ones because some weak-form systems have institutions that 
supplement judicial review and produce a system of constitutional review that, 
taken as a whole, reduces the role even the most activist-minded judges can 
play in developing the actual restraints the constitution places on the 
legislature. 
4. Another essay, Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 
101 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2003), continues my exploration of 
differences between strong- and weak-form systems of judicial review. 
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that there is some evidence that it will do one or the other, and 
sometimes both. The promise that weak-form review may in 
practice substantially reduce democracy-based concerns about 
judicial review, that is, may not be fulfilled. 
II. WHY THE DEBATE BETWEEN ACTMSM AND RESTRAINT 
MAy Now BE MISLEADING 
Every constitution-maker in the past generation has adopted 
some form of constrained parliamentarism, and at present Australia 
and New Zealand provide the only significant examples of nations 
committed to something even approaching the Westminster mode1.5 
For years, the only real alternative to parliamentary supremacy 
appeared to be u.S.-style strong-form judicial review. Strong-form 
judicial review generated its own debate, this one between advocates 
of what was labeled judicial restraint and what was labeled judicial 
activism.6 Advocates of judicial restraint argued that restrained 
courts would interfere with democratic self-governance only when 
doing so was truly necessary; advocates of judicial activism argued 
that a more aggressive posture was necessary to ensure that liberal 
5. Even this has to be qualified. Australia's High Court does enforce the 
federalist limitations on legislative power in the nation's constitution, and has 
toyed with doctrines that would allow it to enforce some human rights on the 
ground that the written constitution's commitment to government responsible 
to the people presupposes such rights. Austl. Capital Television Proprietary, 
Ltd. v. Australia (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106, 107-08 (Austl.) (invalidating a 
campaign finance law as inconsistent with Australia's constitutional 
commitment to representative government); Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997) 
189 C.L.R. 520, 520-21 (Austl.) (limiting Australian Capital Television 
Proprietary, Ltd.). As for New Zealand, James Allan has argued perhaps a bit 
too forcefully that New Zealand's judges have made that nation's Human Rights 
Act, which on its face simply instructs judges to interpret statutes to be 
consistent with basic human rights, into a document that gives judges authority 
to displace legislative authority quite broadly. See, e.g., James Allan, The Effect 
of a Statutory Bill of Rights Where Parliament is Sovereign: The Lesson from 
New Zealand, in SCEPTICAL ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 375 (Tom Campbell et al. 
eds., 2001). 
6. At times that debate seemed to reproduce within the confines of the 
U.S. system the larger debate between parliamentary supremacy and 
constrained parliamentarism. That is, people who were at heart committed to 
parliamentary supremacy found themselves located in a political system with 
some constraints on parliamentary power, and did the best they could by 
arguing that courts should enforce only quite weak restrictions on legislative 
power. Proponents of judicial activism argued in favor of more robust limits, 
although the content of those limits varied with the political inclinations of the 
proponents-some would have the courts actively protect liberal-leaning civil 
rights, others would have the courts actively protect conservative-leaning 
property rights. 
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rights were protected. The extended U.S. experience, coupled with 
the force of the U.S. example in worldwide constitutional 
deliberations, has produced debates over activism and restraint in 
constitutional systems that have moved toward constrained 
parliamentarism. So, for example, Kent Roach has described how 
critics of the Canadian Supreme Court have called it an activist 
court.7 Roach argues that it is misleading to transfer the U.S. 
debate to the Canadian context,8 and I want to use his argument to 
open up a different discussion. 
We can see the structure of the debate between judicial activism 
and judicial restraint by returning to the contrast between 
parliamentary supremacy and constrained parliamentarism. 
Parliamentary supremacy actually had two forms, which I call 
absolute and liberal. Under absolute parliamentary supremacy, 
legislatures had the legal power to enact anything they wished, and 
they had the practical power to do so because the political cultures 
in which they were located did not acknowledge that legislative 
authority was under moral, if not political, limits. Liberal regimes 
with parliamentary supremacy were different. The legislature's 
legal power was unlimited, but the political culture recognized 
moral limits on what a legislature could properly do.9 Sometimes a 
government would propose a policy, and its opponents would argue 
that the proposal should not be adopted because doing so would 
violate moral (or prudential, or practical) limits on government 
power recognized in the political culture. A liberal government 
would respond, not that the objection was irrelevant because the 
government had the sheer legal power to do whatever it wanted, but 
rather that its proposal was consistent with those limits. That is, 
interpretive debates occurred within liberal systems of 
parliamentary supremacy, but they tended to be debates over the 
proper interpretation of largely implicit cultural commitments 
rather than over the interpretation of authoritative documents. 
Constrained parliamentarism gives those interpretive debates a 
somewhat different shape, and a definitively different venue. The 
constraints in modern systems are written, so the debates are about 
what the relevant documents mean.lO More interestingly, the 
7. KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR 
DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE 3-5 (2001). Note the presence of the term activism in the 
subtitle. 
8. Id. at 69. 
9. I do not insist on the term moral here; other terms, such as practical or 
prudential, might do as well. The important point is that the political culture in 
liberal systems of parliamentary supremacy in practice limited what 
legislatures could actually do. 
10. I use the plural here because sometimes the relevant documents 
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debates take place in courts as well as in legislative fora. The latter 
feature of constrained parliamentarism shaped the U.S. discussions 
of judicial restraint and activism. The question that divided the 
sides was, what weight should be given to the legislature's 
resolution of the interpretive question? That is, proponents of 
judicial restraint noted that, in enacting the challenged statute, the 
legislature had-sometimes explicitly but always at least 
implicitly-taken the view that the constitution, properly 
interpreted, did not limit its power to enact the statute. Proponents 
of judicial restraint argued that courts should give this legislative 
interpretation substantial weight, on the assumption that 
legislators were conscientiously attempting to discern and act within 
the limits the constitution placed on them. Their critics were 
skeptical about the seriousness with which legislatures took their 
interpretive obligations, and, at the most general level, sometimes 
argued that courts were required to arrive at interpretive judgments 
independent of prior judgments by other political actors on the same 
question. 
Roach's analysis begins with the observation that the debate 
between judicial activism and restraint is predicated on the 
assumption that courts exercise strong-form judicial review, in 
which the courts' interpretive judgments are final and unrevisable. ll 
The modern articulation of strong-form judicial review is provided in 
Cooper u. Aaron,12 where the U.S. Supreme Court described the 
federal courts as "supreme in the exposition of the law of the 
Constitution," and inferred from that a duty on legislatures to follow 
the Court's interpretations. 13 
A contemporary version came in City of Boerne u. Flores. 14 That 
well-known case involved Congress' power to enact the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("the Act,,/5 pursuant to its power 
to "enforce" the prohibitions placed on state governments by Section 
One of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 Previously, the Supreme 
Court had interpreted the guarantees of religious exercise protected 
by Section One to bar states from targeting religious exercises for 
proscription, but otherwise to allow them to enforce general laws 
that happened to have an adverse impact on religious exercise.17 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act swept more broadly, 
include international agreements such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights as well as national constitutions. 
11. ROACH, supra note 7, at 29. Of course, judicial finality can be overcome 
through a difficult process of constitutional amendment. 
12. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
13. Id. at 18. 
14. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994). 
16. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516-17. 
17. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-79 (1990). 
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requiring states to have strong justifications even for general laws 
that burdened religious exercise. 
The question for the Court was whether the Act "enforced" 
Section One. Analytically, one could take the position that the scope 
of Section One is open to reasonable alternative interpretations, the 
Supreme Court's prior interpretation being the first and Congress' 
more recent one the second. On that view, the Act did enforce 
Section One, when Section One received the interpretation Congress 
gave it. The Supreme Court took a different view. 18 For the Court, 
the only rights to be enforced were those the Court itself recognized. 
According to the Court, "[l]egislation which alters the meaning of the 
Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause.,,19 It 
continued, "If Congress could define its own powers by altering the 
Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the 
Constitution be 'superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary 
means.",20 
The deep assumption of strong-form review is found in the word 
alter. A proponent of some other version of judicial review might 
have written, "Congress has the power to specify the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, at least so long as its specification is 
reasonable, although different from the specification we ourselves 
would provide." Similarly, that proponent might have written: 
The Constitution defines the powers of Congress in broad 
terms; when Congress provides a reasonable specification of 
those terms' meaning in a particular context, courts should 
give considerable weight to that judgment. This does not allow 
Congress to alter the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, but 
merely follows from the Constitution's allocation of 
interpretive power to both Congress and the courts. 
This formulation shows the connection between the assumption that 
the United States has strong-form judicial review, and the debate 
over activism and restraint. 
For Roach, the U.S. debates are misleading because constrained 
parliamentarism now can take a weak form. Weak-form systems of 
judicial review openly acknowledge the power of legislatures to 
provide constitutional interpretations that differ from-or, in the 
U.S. Supreme Court's terms, alter-the constitutional 
interpretations provided by the courts. Roach, a Canadian scholar, 
18. No judge disagreed with the position taken in City of Boerne about the 
finality to be given to the Court's interpretation of Section One, although 
several justices expressed their disagreement with that interpretation. 
19. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (emphasis added). 
20. Id. at 529 (emphasis added) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803». 
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concentrates on the role of section 33, the notwithstanding clause.21 
That provision allows a legislature to make effective a statute 
"notwithstanding" the enumerated provisions of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights ("Charter"). As Jeffrey Goldsworthy points out, 
the precise formulation of the section 33 power may be 
unfortunate.22 Legislatures can invoke section 33 prospectively-
that is, before the courts have indicated that the new statute is 
inconsistent with the courts' interpretation of Charter rights-Qr 
after the courts have acted.23 Invoking the section 33 power before 
the courts have acted, legislatures must say to the public, ''We 
believe that what we are about to do might well violate Charter 
rights, but we want the statute to go into effect notwithstanding 
that possible violation." Invoking the power after the courts have 
acted, legislatures can easily be misled into saying, "Although the 
statute does indeed violate Charter rights, as the courts have held, 
we want the statute to be effective notwithstanding that violation." 
What weak-form systems should do is highlight the possibility of 
reasonable interpretive disagreement between courts and 
legislatures. When invoked prospectively, the message should be, 
''We are afraid that the courts will reasonably but erroneously 
misinterpret the Charter to preclude us from enforcing this statute, 
which we reasonably believe to be consistent with the Charter 
properly interpreted. We invoke section 33 to insulate the statute 
from a mistaken judicial interpretation.,,24 In this setting, it would 
21. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. 1 (Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms), § 33. For further discussion, see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Judicial 
Review, Legislative Override, and Democracy, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451 
(2003). 
22. Goldsworthy, supra note 21, at 468; see also Mark Tushnet, Policy 
Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245, 279-80 (1995) (pointing 
out the problems with the phrasing of section 33). 
23. For the validation of prospective invocation, see Ford v. Quebec, (1988) 
2 S.C.R. 712, 742-45 (Can.). The only other significant invocation of section 33 
also has been prospective, in Alberta's insulation of its marriage statute from a 
challenge based on equality claims by those seeking to establish gay marriages. 
For a discussion, see ROACH, supra note 7, at 199-200. (I agree with 
Goldsworthy's observation that the list of section 33 invocations by Tsvi Kahana 
overstates the importance of the invocations she identifies. See Goldsworthy, 
supra note 21, at 466-67 (discussing Tsvi Kahana, The Notwithstanding 
Mechanism and Public Discussion: Lessons from the Ignored Practice of Section 
33 of the Charter, 44 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 255 (2001)).) 
24. Formulating a provision that would allow legislatures to send this 
message is not easy. One version would explicitly say that legislatures can 
make statutes effective notwithstanding a judicial interpretation of 
constitutional rights, but that version makes it difficult to invoke the provision 
prospectively, in anticipation of a judicial decision projected from what the 
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be clear that the language of judicial restraint or activism would be 
misplaced. Rather, interpretive disagreements between courts and 
legislatures would be at stake, which is in fact what the controversy 
over activism and restraint is actually about anyway. 
III. TYPES OF WEAK-FORM JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The "notwithstanding" clause provides the most studied 
example of weak-form judicial review, and the one with which there 
has been the most experience. There are other types of weak-form 
review, however. Stephen Gardbaum has identified several, which 
he calls the "new Commonwealth model" of constitutionalism.25 The 
"new Commonwealth model" consists of instructions to courts that 
they should construe legislation whenever fairly possible to be 
consistent with constitutional norms, without giving them the power 
to displace legislation that, once interpreted, is inconsistent with 
those norms.26 Gardbaum identifies the possibility that there may 
be a variety of types of judicial review, lying along a continuum 
measuring the strength of the judicial role relative to that of the 
legislature. 
The weakest form within the "new Commonwealth model" is the 
courts have previously done. (Tushnet, supra note 22, at 279, suggested that 
section 33 should have been interpreted to allow only retrospective invocations 
of section 33, but I now regard that suggestion as mistaken; prospective 
invocations can be useful where legislatures fear what courts might do.) The 
trick lies in highlighting the fact that courts and legislatures can reasonably 
disagree about how the constitution should be interpreted, and not giving 
either's interpretation any necessary priority. 
It should be noted that section 33 was developed rather late in the 
process of drafting the Charter, and, while its proponents had a reasonably 
clear idea of what they were trying to do, they may not have had time to draft 
terms that would do precisely what they wanted-or, at least, what they should 
have wanted. 
25. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of 
Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMPo L. 707,710 (2001). I prefer to use the more 
general label weak-form for the variants Gardbaum describes, largely because I 
do not think that there is an intrinsic connection between the form of review 
and the fact that the nations that have adopted weak-form systems of judicial 
review are, or were, members of the British Commonwealth. 
26. I think it worth emphasizing that I focus here on the effects of weak-
form statutes on the courts. Designers of weak-form systems typically also 
include instructions to legislatures, in particular developing some mechanism 
by which legislative proposals are vetted for constitutionality within the 
legislative process before they are adopted. The British Human Rights Act 
1998, for example, requires the minister responsible for introducing a bill to 
declare either that the bill is compatible with the European Convention on 
Human Rights, or that he or she is unable to make such a declaration. Human 
Rights Act, 1998, C. 42, * 19 (Eng.). 
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pure interpretive requirement, for which the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Ace7 is the prime example. Here courts are charged only 
with the new interpretive task. The British Human Rights Act 
199828 is a somewhat stronger version. It directs courts to interpret 
statutes in a manner that makes them consistent with the European 
Convention on Human Rights ("the Convention"), if such a 
construction is possible. Courts unable to do so may declare the 
statute incompatible with the Convention. The minister responsible 
for the statute's enforcement is then authorized to invoke a fast-
track procedure for enacting a new statute that would be compatible 
with the Convention or even, in special circumstances, to place in 
force a revised statute pending its enactment by Parliament. 
That the pure interpretive requirement is a form of judicial 
review can be seen by comparing what happens to a statute in a 
system without such a requirement to what happens in a system 
with one. Suppose the courts, without an interpretive requirement, 
routinely interpret statutes according to their plain language on the 
theory that the statute's language is the surest guide to the 
purposes the legislature sought to achieve. That is, the courts say, 
in effect, ''You told us what you wanted to do in the statute's plain 
language, and that's what we will do." Add on the interpretive 
requirement, and the courts say something quite different: 
The language of this statute tells us what you wanted to do, 
but if we did that you would be violating constitutional norms. 
You've also told us that you don't want to do that. So, we'll 
interpret the statute to be consistent with constitutional 
norms, even though that leads us to enforce a statute that does 
something other than what the statutory language says you 
wanted to do.29 
Weak-form judicial review in the form of an interpretive mandate 
27. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990 (N.Z.). 
28. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). 
29. Two points should be noted: (1) The analysis does not depend on the 
particular "plain language" theory of interpretation I have used in the example. 
All that matters is that courts acting under the interpretive requirement will do 
something they would not do absent such a requirement; (2) Analytic problems 
arise in connection with statutes enacted before and after the "new model" of 
judicial review is adopted. For those enacted earlier, the difficulty is that the 
legislature cannot be said to have wanted the courts to accommodate the 
legislature's purposes to the (newly enforceable) constitutional norms. For 
those enacted afterwards (particularly those enacted with a ministerial 
statement of compatibility), the difficulty is that the legislature may have 
believed that its statute was consistent with constitutional norms (and the 
legislature's judgment should be given some weight), or the legislature may 
have wanted the statute to be enforced even though it was inconsistent with 
those norms. 
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gives the courts an effect on policy that is different from the effect 
they have using their traditional methods of statutory 
interpretation. 
Government of South Africa v. Grootboom30 of South Africa's 
Constitutional Court provides another variant, which itself can be 
seen as a version of a broader type of weak-form judicial review that 
Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel identify with what they call 
democratic experimentalism.31 Grootboom involved a challenge to 
South Africa's housing policy, which was said to be inconsistent with 
the constitution's guarantee of a right to housing.32 To escape the 
"appalling" conditions of their residences, a group of people moved 
onto land designated by the government for subsidized low-cost 
housing, which had not, however, been constructed yet.33 They were 
evicted from the land, and challenged the Novernment's policy, 
which had not produced any housing for them. The Constitutional 
Court upheld the challenge.35 It did not direct that housing be 
provided to the challengers, however. Its precise holding was that 
the government's housing policy was unconstitutional because it 
lacked a component to deal with the housing needs of those in 
desperate need-that is, the plaintiffs.36 The court's remedy was to 
direct the government to revise its policy to include such a 
component, even while acknowledging that the litigants might not 
themselves benefit from the revised policy.37 
Dorf and Sabel treat approaches like that taken in Grootboom 
as exemplifying a distinctive variant of weak-form judicial review, 
part of a group of legal techniques they call democratic 
experimentalism.38 A democratic experimentalist court begins with 
a constitutional principle stated at a reasonably high level of 
abstraction, such as the South African provision purporting to 
guarantee access to adequate housing. It begins the experimentalist 
project by offering an incomplete specification of the principle's 
meaning in a particular context, such as the requirement that the 
government's housing programs specifically address the housing 
needs of those in desperate need. The court then asks legislators 
and executive officials to develop and begin to implement plans that 
30. 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (S. Afr.). 
31. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). 
32. 2000 (11) BCLR enen 1-2. 
33. Id. en 3. 
34. Id. enen 3-4. 
35. Id. en 99. 
36. Id. en 95. 
37. Id. en 96. The following paragraph is drawn from Mark Tushnet, State 
Action, Social Welfare Rights, and the Judicial Role: Some Comparative 
Observations, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 435 (2002). 
38. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 31. 
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have a reasonable prospect of fulfilling the incompletely specified 
constitutional requirement. The next step involves examining the 
results of this experiment. Perhaps legislators and executive 
officials will be able to demonstrate that their programs are moving 
in the right direction. A democratic experimentalist court might 
respond by fleshing out the constitutional requirement a bit more, 
specifying in somewhat more detail what the government must do to 
fulfill its broad obligation to ensure access to adequate housing. Or, 
perhaps legislators and executive officials will be able to show that 
the task they initially set for themselves in response to the court's 
first decision could not be accomplished within a reasonable time, or 
with reasonable resources, and propose some modification in the 
constitutional standard. For example, they might have proposed to 
build permanent housing for those in desperate need, but, having 
discovered that land is unavailable at a reasonable cost for such 
purposes, propose now to develop temporary shelters for those 
people. A democratic experimentalist court could revise its 
judgment about the constitution's requirements in light of 
experience. Notably, that adjustment might be upward, imposing 
more requirements on the government, or downward, imposing 
fewer. The revisability of a court's constitutional judgments makes 
this a weak-form version of judicial review. 
I think it worth emphasizing that Grootboom and democratic 
experimentalist judicial review should be understood as providing 
general variants of weak-form judicial review. The social-welfare 
context in which Grootboom arose might make weak-form judicial 
review particularly attractive in light of widespread misgivings-
among constitutionalists familiar only with strong-form systems of 
judicial review-about judicial enforcement of social-welfare rights.39 
But, weak-form judicial review in the form of planning or 
experimentalism might be appropriate in more traditional civil 
liberties contexts as well. Consider free expression, for example. 
One might balk at adopting experimentalist approaches to the 
question of regulating political dissent.40 The cases of regulating the 
39. See Tushnet, supra note 37 (discussing those misgivings and arguing 
that they are not well-founded). 
40. See Richard A. Epstein, Classical Liberalism Meets the New 
Constitutional Order: A Comment on Mark Tushnet, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 455, 464 
(2002). I believe that Epstein might be correct in being nervous about using 
experimentalist approaches in connection with traditional First Amendment 
doctrine regarding political dissent, but only because judicial experience has 
been sufficiently thick that we can fairly say that experiments conducted in the 
past have produced near definitive results. Put another way, an 
experimentalist might describe the common-law-like evolution of constitutional 
doctrine dealing with the regulation of political dissent as an example of 
experimentalism rather than seeing the application of the doctrine in its 
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Internet, or regulating campaign finance, might be different, 
though. There, experience with forms of regulation is thinner, the 
problems are either new, or take new forms, or are complex in ways 
not readily seen until regulatory systems are put in place. Rather 
than invoke traditional doctrines that ask whether a regulation is 
content-based or content-neutral, courts might profitably require 
that governments develop coherent plans for regulation, or engage 
in the kind of interactive process with legislatures contemplated by 
democratic experimentalism.41 
IV. THE POSSIBLE DEGENERATION OR ESCAlATION OF 
WEAK-FORM JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Systems of weak-form judicial review are attractive objects of 
study, if only because they provide an opportunity to think about 
judicial review outside the tired categories of activism and 
restraint.42 But, are they truly distinctive systems? I suggest some 
reasons for thinking that weak-form systems may be unstable in 
practice. That is, they may well be transformed in either direction-
reducing their scope so that weak-form systems are actually systems 
of parliamentary supremacy (and thereby reproducing the worry 
about inadequate protection of liberal rights), or expanding their 
scope so that weak-form systems are actually strong-form systems 
(and thereby reproducing the worry about interfering with 
democratic self-governance). The thought here is that, while there 
may be in theory a continuum of forms of judicial review, in 
practical operation of institutions in the real world, institutions are 
likely to cluster near the poles of u.S.-style strong-form review and 
traditional parliamentary sovereignty, with very little judicial 
review. 
Notably, these possibilities are open for each system, and the 
tension within my arguments should be emphasized at the outset. I 
will be producing arguments explaining why a weak-form system 
might become a system of parliamentary supremacy, and why that 
exact same system might become a strong-form system. Obviously, 
the arguments cannot both be correct with respect to every 
current, apparently final form as a refutation of experimentalism. 
41. For a suggestion regarding campaign finance regulation that I regard 
as compatible with democratic experimentalist theory, see William P. Marshall, 
The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 335, 
390 (2000) (suggesting that states be allowed to develop campaign finance 
regulations under standards that might differ from those applied to the 
national government). 
42. I doubt that they can readily be emulated in the United States, where 
the structure of judicial review and, perhaps more important, the legal culture 
seem to support strong-form review with little qualification. 
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constitutional question presented to the courts. Perhaps only one of 
the arguments I develop is correct with respect to any particular 
national system. Or, more interestingly, perhaps a weak-form 
system will degenerate into parliamentary supremacy with respect 
to some questions, and escalate into a strong-form system with 
respect to other questions.43 
Another preliminary is that the actual operation of weak-form 
systems may be highly dependent on context. I will discuss some 
implications of political organization in the course of dealing with 
section 33, but dependency on historical circumstances is worth 
noting at the start. The basic idea is that a constitutional system's 
early experiences with judicial review may set the constitutional 
culture on a distinctive path. In the United States, for example, it is 
said that Chief Justice John Marshall's assertion of the power of 
judicial review in Marbury v. Madison44 established strong-form 
review in the United States because, basically, he got away with it.45 
GDldsworthy and I both suggest that Canadian legislatures have 
been reluctant to use the section 33 power because that power was 
discredited by its invocation by Quebec to insulate all Quebec 
legislation from review under the Charter.46 Its most recent use, to 
forestall a contemplated decision finding that provinces giving 
heterosexual marriage legal status must give the same status to gay 
malTIages, seems unlikely to lend more luster to the section 33 
power. 
In the other direction, it will be interesting to see how the South 
African constitutional system reacts to Grootboom, which imposed a 
rather mild planning requirement on the government, and the 
nevirapine case, which imposed a somewhat more substantial 
requirement. 47 There the government had limited the provision of 
nevirapine, an effective drug treatment against the transmission of 
HIV from pregnant mothers to their children.46 The government 
43. If so, perhaps we might end up thinking that the system is weak-form 
"on balance"; that is, as interpreted within the nation's constitutional culture, 
even though there is no single question on which judicial review actually takes 
a weak form. 
44. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
45. For one version of this account, see ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE 
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 25 (revised by Sanford Levinson, 3d. ed. 2000) 
(describing Marbury as "a masterwork of indirection, a brilliant example of 
Marshall's capacity to ... advance in one direction while his opponents are 
looking in another"). 
46. Goldsworthy, supra note 21, at 464-65; Tushnet, supra note 22, at 295-
97. 
47. Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (10) BCLR 
1033 91 135 (S. Afr.). 
48. [d. 919110-11. 
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made the drug available at a few experimental sites, where it also 
provided counseling on nevirapine use, breast-feeding, and other 
matters relevant to reducing the risk of mother-to-child 
transmission ofHIV.49 
The Constitutional Court held that the government had to 
rethink its plan for preventing mother-to-child transmission of 
HIV.50 The court agreed that monitoring nevirapine administration 
at a limited number of research sites made "good sense from the 
public health point ofview,,,51 but observed that such monitoring was 
not inconsistent with administering the drug more widely, at sites 
where no research-monitoring occurred. 52 The new comprehensive 
plan had to include extending the provision of nevirapine from the 
limited number of sites to all public facilities, and expanding the 
training of counselors at all public facilities to include counseling on 
the use of the drug. 53 The court's language suggests that the 
comprehensive plan might have to go even farther, although the 
court did not specify further details. 
The nevirapine case illustrates the path-dependence of judicial 
review. Although nothing to this effect appears in the opinion, 
South African legal elites knew that the government's policy was 
motivated in large measure by President Thabo Mbeki's expressed 
view that AIDS was not caused by HIV. Further, the government's 
litigation posture was weak: Nevirapine had passed through the 
ordinary processes for the approval of drugs, indicating that its use 
was not dangerous, the government conceded that providing 
nevirapine to all women using public facilities would not be 
excessively expensive,54 and the government conceded that 
counselors already present at public hospitals could include 
nevirapine counseling in their programs. Finally, the government 
had decided to make nevirapine generally available by the time the 
Constitutional Court decided the case. 
In short, the nevirapine case was a perfect one for exercising 
judicial review. The government's position was discredited and had 
been abandoned. The Constitutional Court could pretty much do 
whatever it wanted in the case. One can imagine a next stage in 
which Grootboom and the nevirapine case become precedents for 
insisting that substantial plans be developed and implemented. The 
49. [d. '11'11 14-15. 
50. [d. '11'11 124-33. 
51. [d. 'II 15. 
52. [d. 'II 68. 
53. [d. 'II 135. 
54. According to the plaintiffs, nevirapine had been "offered to the 
government for free." [d. 'II 11. 
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nevirapine case in particular might be assimilated into South 
Africa's constitutional culture as an example of the effective use of 
strong-form judicial review. But perhaps not. Perhaps the culture 
will take as more important the unusual circumstances of the 
nevirapine case, treat the case as a sport, and give judicial review a 
weak form again. 55 
A Degenerating Into Parliamentary Supremacy 
Accustomed to strong-form judicial review, U.S. scholars may be 
particularly attracted to the idea that weak-form judicial review is 
fundamentally a sham, parliamentary supremacy parading under 
the guise of effective judicial review. The Human Rights Act might 
offer such skeptics a strong example, but the problem can arise in all 
systems of weak-form review. Consider a statute adopted after a 
minister makes a statement of compatibility, reflecting the 
government's judgment that the statute is consistent with the 
European Convention. A court comes along and issues a declaration 
of incompatibility. True, the minister now has the authority to 
introduce fast-track legislation to modify the statute, and the 
commentary routinely asserts that everyone expects such a 
response. But, why should a minister use that authority? If the 
statute is one to which the government is committed in principle, 
the minister and the government can express their disagreement 
with the courts on the interpretive question-as to which they had 
already expressed their views in the statement of compatibility-
and insist on enforcing the statute as adopted. 56 
Grootboom and related approaches can degenerate into 
55. Of course, the South African Constitutional Court has exercised strong-
form judicial review in more traditional civil liberties cases. That, too, might 
push it away from adopting weak-form review in some restricted subset of 
constitutional cases. (The obvious candidate for such a subset is social welfare 
rights, but, as I argued briefly above, there is no reason in principle to restrict 
weak-form review to social welfare rights.) 
56. For a qualification, see infra text accompanying notes 72, 74-75. 
Another qualification, for a government truly insistent on achieving its 
purposes, is that the European Convention itself authorizes governments to 
derogate from its provisions under quite limited circumstances. A government 
could introduce legislation conceding its incompatibility with the Convention 
and simultaneously derogating from the Convention with respect to such 
legislation. (That is what the Blair government did in introducing the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.).) It is an open question 
whether the British courts could review the question whether the conditions for 
derogation as set out in the Convention were satisfied, although I assume that 
the European Court on Human Rights can do so. For a brief discussion, see 
Mark Tushnet, Nonjudicial Review, 40 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming July 
2003). 
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parliamentary supremacy as welL On its face Grootboom requires 
only that the government submit a plan for public housing that 
contains a component dealing with the desperately needy. 
Grootboom itself would be satisfied once the government has 
submitted such a plan. That is, the government can fully comply 
with Grootboom by developing a plan that it has no intention of 
implementing. The plan would be like the Soviet five-year plans, 
existing on paper but having no beneficial real-world impact. These 
sorts of paper rights are not unknown in constitutional law. The 
Supreme Court of India, for example, has been extremely aggressive 
in articulating a wide range of constitutional rights. But, according 
to one observer, that court operates "in almost metaphysical 
isolation from social reality.,,57 
Perhaps more interesting, because more likely, is nominal 
compliance with a weak-form court's requirements, followed by a 
judicial declaration of victory and retreat from the field. Two 
examples are instructive. The New Jersey Supreme Court engaged 
in a long-term effort to increase the supply of housing for the poor, 
by finding that localities were constitutionally obligated to bear 
their "fair share" of such housing. 58 Acting in a roughly 
experimentalist way, the court invited a range of responses from 
legislatures, on both the local and the state levels, rather than 
specifying how "fair shares" should be determined and distributed. 59 
Not surprisingly, many suburban jurisdictions strenuously resisted 
taking on the "fair share" obligation.60 After a long series of 
exchanges, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared itself satisfied 
with the legislative responses, despite the fact that low-income 
housing remained pretty much in the same supply as had existed 
before the court began to act.61 
Roach provides a Canadian example, particularly dramatic 
because of the forgone possibility of utilizing section 33 in response 
to a Canadian Supreme Court decision with which the legislature 
disagreed. O'Connor u. The Queen62 involved a prosecution for rape 
of four women in a residential school that occurred decades before 
the prosecution.63 The defendant demanded access to the records 
57. Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in 
India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMPo L. 495, 515 (1989). 
58. CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SEIGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS 
JUDGES 20-21 (1996). 
59. Id. at 26-28. 
60. Id. at 111. 
61. For an overview, see especially id. at 124-25 (describing the New Jersey 
Supreme Court's "expressed intent to defer to the council" and its "continuing 
desire, almost a need, to assert judge-made policy"). 
62. [1995] 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Can.). 
63. Id. at 2. 
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compiled during counseling· sessions with the victims.64 The 
Canadian Supreme Court decided, by a vote of 5 to 4, that the 
defendant had an unqualified right to all records in the 
prosecution's possession, and that the defendant could get access to 
possibly relevant records in the hands of doctors and rape crisis 
counselors if the trial court determined they should be made 
available after balancing the defendant's right to present a defense 
against the victims' rights to privacy.65 The dissenters would have 
required the defendant to make a substantially stronger showing of 
need before gaining access to records in private hands.66 
The Canadian Parliament responded to O'Connor with new 
legislation that, according to Roach, "followed the dissent... by 
subjecting all records ... to a two-stage process that balances the 
accused's rights against the complainant's privacy and equality 
rights and the social interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual 
assaults.,,67 And, like the dissent, the statute enumerated "ten 
allegations that, alone or together, were not sufficient to establish 
that a record was relevant.,,66 The Canadian Supreme Court found 
that the new legislation satisfied the Charter.69 Saving face, it 
characterized O'Connor as a common-law decision, not one resting 
on the defendant's rights under the Charter, and asserted that the 
new legislation was, like the court's earlier "common law" rule, a 
reasonable specification of the protected right to present a defense.7o 
Roach, a specialist in criminal law and procedure, believes that the 
legislation was indeed inconsistent with O'Connor, and that it would 
have been better for the court to say so and invite the legislature to 
use its power under section 33 to override a judicial interpretation of 
the Charter. 71 
The Canadian cases illustrate a problem common to weak-form 
and strong-form systems, but which takes on particular resonance in 
weak-form systems. The problem is that courts are not insensitive 
to the political responses to their actions.72 Sometimes they retreat 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 6-7. 
66. Id. at 17-18. 
67. ROACH, supra note 7, at 278. 
68. Id. 
69. L.C. v. Mills, [1999] 139 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 339-40 (Can.). 
70. Id. at 338-40, 353-54, 357-58, 390-91. If the initial decision was fairly 
described as a common-law decision, then the sequence of cases and legislation 
does not illustrate the operation of any form of judicial review at all, but only 
the ordinary and well-established practice of legislation consistent with the 
constitution displacing the common law. 
71. ROACH, supra note 7, at 279-81. 
72. In the United States, the Supreme Court's reaction to congressional 
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from advanced positions but attempt to conceal their capitulation to 
political disagreement by insisting that the new cases are truly and 
fairly distinguishable from the older ones. These retreats can be 
described as reinstituting systems of parliamentary supremacy with 
respect to the rights at issue. In strong-form systems of judicial 
review, perhaps such retreats are sometimes necessary if the courts 
are to retain their power to overturn other legislation. What is 
striking is that weak-form systems purport to make such retreats 
unnecessary, because legislatures have the means at hand to reject 
the courts' decisions. Perhaps we can describe weak-form systems 
as degenerating when the retreats occur in such systems 
nonetheless. 
The section 33 power suggests another way in which weak-form 
systems can degenerate. Defenders of Canada's system of judicial 
review have asserted that it promotes dialogue between the courts 
and the legislature.73 I discuss some aspects of that dialogue below. 
For now, consider two types of "dialogue"-really, different 
monologues. First, sometimes a legislature will pass a statute that, 
on reflection, its members think ill-considered. The courts can 
invalidate the statute, and the legislature will do nothing in 
response even though it has the power to override the courts' 
decision. The reason is that the legislature, on reflection, agrees 
with the courts. This, sometimes called the "sober second thought" 
effect, is a real benefit of judicial review, whether strong- or weak-
form. Second, suppose that the legislature routinely invoked its 
power to override the courts whenever a court invalidated a 
statute. 74 Weak-form review, under those circumstances, would be 
indistinguishable from parliamentary supremacy. 75 Weak-form 
disapproval of a number of 1957 decisions involving the free speech rights of 
alleged Communists is an oft-cited example. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE 
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 137 (2000) (describing two 1958 cases as 
"[tlhe Court's major peace offering" to Congress). The conventional story is that 
the Court followed up those cases by retreating from the protections it 
articulated, and upheld prosecutions that it would have barred earlier. 
73. The most prominent work is Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The 
Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75 
(1997), which has generated substantial responsive literature. 
74. Of course, routine use of the power to override would occur only because 
of the political culture's understanding of the courts' role in the constitutional 
system. 
75. As has most of the literature on judicial review, I have ignored the 
possibility of constitutional amendment as a response to judicial decisions. 
Constitutions that have judicial review, whether strong- or weak-form, and easy 
amendment processes, are similarly systems of parliamentary supremacy-so 
long as the political culture imposes no practical barriers to invoking the 
amendment process. 
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review supports true dialogue only when the legislature actually 
does respond to judicial decisions, but only on occasion. 
There are, then, predictable ways in which weak-form systems 
of judicial review can be ineffectual. Next, I consider some 
predictable ways in which such systems can become strong-form 
systems in effect, if not in formal, law. 
B. Escalating Into Strong-Form Review 
Weak-form systems of judicial review seem attractive to some 
because they provide an opportunity for judicial oversight of 
legislation without displacing the ultimate power of legislatures to 
determine public policy. That possibility would be illusory, though, 
if weak-form review in practice turned out to be as final as strong-
form review is in theory.76 How might weak-form review escalate 
into strong-form review? Each version of weak-form review might 
be transformed through routes characteristic of the version. 
Consider first Grootboom and experimentalist approaches. The 
conceptualization of these approaches as weak-form review is 
relatively new, but the approaches themselves are less novel than 
one might think. The New Jersey experience with low-income 
housing is representative of a broader phenomenon of institutional 
litigation in the United States; that is, litigation aimed at 
transforming the routine operation of large-scale government 
bureaucracies such as social service agencies and, notably, prisons. 
The course of such litigation is reasonably clear. As we have 
seen, sometimes the courts declare victory and go home, with 
nothing much accomplished. Sometimes, though, the courts take 
the task of institutional transformation seriously.77 They begin by 
observing gross violations of core constitutional rights, and direct 
the institutions to stop. The institutions are either recalcitrant, 
believing that what they have been doing is essential to carrying out 
their assigned missions, or incompetent, unable to develop 
mechanisms for performing their missions that do not violate 
constitutional rights. Courts respond by developing increasingly 
precise requirements for the institutions. The reason is twofold. 
When dealing with recalcitrant institutions, courts can monitor 
compliance with these requirements more easily than they can 
monitor compliance with general directives to stop behaving badly. 
76. Of course the form of judicial review might remain the same, but when 
weak-form review escalates it loses its distinctive capacity to constrain the 
legislature and the courts through a process of dialogue and reconsideration. 
77. The most comprehensive discussion and analysis of modern 
institutional litigation in the United States is MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD 
L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS 
REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998). 
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When dealing with incompetent institutions, courts can use detailed 
requirements to show even incompetents what they need to do. 
Something similar might happen with Grootboom-like planning 
requirements. The court directs the government to develop a plan 
and begin to implement it. The plaintiffs come back to court, saying 
that the plan is inadequate in various respects, and that the 
implementation is flawed. The court responds by insisting that the 
plan be augmented to deal with the inadequacies and flaws. In the 
next round, new inadequacies and flaws are exposed, and the court 
again tries to get the plan to work. 
The U.S. experience with school desegregation is instructive. 
After holding that segregation by law was unconstitutional, the 
Supreme Court directed lower courts to supervise the development 
of plans by school boards to desegregate their schools "with all 
deliberate speed.,,78 School boards came up with a variety of plans, 
including plans that would desegregate one grade per year and 
plans that allowed students to choose which schools they would 
attend. The courts initially accepted most of these plans. Plaintiffs 
returned to court to point out that under the plans as implemented 
schools remained as racially identifiable as ever. Courts responded 
by ratcheting up the requirements. Eventually the U.S. Supreme 
Court demanded that school boards come up with plans that 
"promise[d] realistically to work, and promise[d] realistically to 
work now.'079 Lower courts took this injunction seriously, adopting 
plans that specified school operations in enormous detail. 80 
What deserves emphasis here is that the processes I have 
sketched are entirely consistent with the general description of 
experimentalist judicial review. Courts specify constitutional 
requirements at a relatively high level of generality, observe how 
the institution responds, and adjust their constitutional 
specifications accordingly. In the end, we end up with courts 
micromanaging the institutions-just in the way a court exercising 
strong-form review would. 
Next, consider the section 33 process in Canada. Roach's work 
shows that critics of Canada's Supreme Court believe that it has 
engaged in strong-form and activist judicial review. The quite 
limited use of section 33 itself suggests that there is little difference 
between the Canadian system and one in which the Constitutional 
78. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
79. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). 
80. The poster child for such plans was at issue in Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 
U.S. 70 (1995), where the Court substantially limited the power of district 
courts to require large-scale program revisions to ensure, in the district courts' 
view, that desegregation plans "worked." [d. at 101-02. 
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Court's decisions are final. 
As Goldsworthy points out, the reasons for section 33's 
desuetude are unclear, although the path-dependency mentioned 
above probably plays a large part.8! Defenders of Canada's system 
as weak-form despite the rare use of the section 33 power make two 
points. First, they point out that the failure to invoke section 33 
does not show that Canada has a strong-form system. Legislatures 
might not invoke section 33 because, having listened to the Supreme 
Court, they decide that the court's interpretation of the Charter is 
correct. Democratic responsibility for Charter-interpretation is 
preserved, on this argument, because legislatures ultimately 
endorse the court's interpretations. Second, they note that 
sometimes legislatures do respond to Supreme Court decisions by 
re-enacting new versions of the statutes the court invalidated, 
altering them to meet the court's objections. In this way, according 
to Peter Hogg, the government achieves (most of) its policy 
objectives at smaller cost to Charter rights.82 Each of these 
arguments can be questioned. 
Legislatures might not use the section 33 power because they 
agree with the courts' interpretations, it is true, but they may also 
fail to use the power because they are unable to use it. The reason 
lies in the structure of the legislative process. That structure is 
more clearly exposed in a separation-of-powers system than in a 
parliamentary system, but, after making the point in the easier 
context, I will show how the argument goes in parliamentary 
systems. The general problem is that the legislative process has a 
number of what political scientists call "veto points," places where 
less than a majority of the legislature can stop legislative proposals 
from going forward. In the United States, legislative committees, or 
even sub-committees, can be veto points.83 Forty Senators constitute 
a veto point for most legislation as well, given recent changes in 
Senate norms regarding the propriety of filibusters. And, of course, 
the President has a formal veto power. Legislative inaction-of any 
sort, including the failure to invoke the override power-thus cannot 
be taken to represent a legislative judgment that the proposal (to 
override a court decision, for example) is ill-considered. Inaction 
81. Goldsworthy, supra note 21, at 466-69. 
82. See Hogg & Bushnell, supra note 73, at 85. 
83. Note, for example, that judicial nominations in the United States 
Senate do not go forward until the Senate Committee on the Judiciary holds a 
hearing on the nomination, and that scheduling a hearing is entirely in the 
hands of the Committee's chair. Similarly, a nomination does not go to the full 
Senate if a majority of the Committee votes against the nomination. Obviously, 
the Committee majority may-but need not-be representative of the Senate as 
a whole. 
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may result from the exercise of power by a minority strategically 
located at a veto point. 
Canada's parliamentary system appears-but only appears-to 
have fewer veto points. As a matter of formal law, a government 
can impose party discipline on its members and deploy its majority 
to enact anything the Prime Minister and Cabinet care enough 
about. So, one might think, the failure to invoke section 33 in 
Canada does indeed show that legislatures do not disagree strongly 
enough with court interpretations to do anything about them. But, 
here the formal law is misleading. Parliamentary majorities are 
actually coalitions, sometimes formal but sometimes informal. 
Imposing party discipline is politically costly-which means that a 
prime minister who does so with respect to one proposal will 
inevitably find it more difficult to assemble a legislative majority for 
some other proposal.84 Failure to invoke the section 33 power does 
not mean that a majority approved of the courts' interpretation. It 
means only that the government surveyed the political terrain and 
decided that it would lose more on other important issues if it 
imposed party discipline to override the courts. Weak-form judicial 
review is supposed to impose political costs on the government by 
drawing public attention to the possibility that the government has 
violated constitutional rights. But, it imposes other political costs as 
well, not inherent in the theory of weak-form review but inherent in 
the structure of policy-making, as it induces the government to 
change its policy priorities. These costs may be sufficient to convert 
a decision that nominally can be overridden into one that is 
effectively final. 85 
Judicial interpretations also impose a policy cost on 
84. After the Canadian Supreme Court's abortion decision, the government 
introduced legislation that would have changed the nation's abortion law in a 
way that would have complied with the Court's requirements but would have 
still restricted the availability of abortions substantially. Anticipating the 
political costs of imposing party discipline, at a crucial point the government 
decided to allow a free vote-that is, informed members of the majority party in 
Parliament that they were free to vote their consciences on the proposal without 
regard to the fact that it was supported by the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
The proposal failed on an evenly divided vote. For a description of the voting 
process, see F.L. MORTON, PRO-CHOICE vs. PRo-LIFE: ABORTION AND THE COURTS 
IN CANADA 290-93 (1992). 
85. A defender of weak-form review could reply that a failure to override 
demonstrates that the government simply does not care enough about the 
substantive constitutional issue. But this means only that effecting the 
government's continued views of constitutional rights will impose policy losses 
in some other area that the government regards as more important. The point 
here is that the judiciary may succeed in imposing its views within the 
constitutional domain because of the government's concerns about issues 
outside that domain. 
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government, which proponents of weak-form judicial review as 
dialogue undervalue. Consider legislation adopted in response to 
court decisions invalidating earlier legislation or interpreting it 
distinctively because of constitutional concerns, and clearly 
consistent with those decisions. The new legislation cannot 
accomplish precisely what the earlier one did, because the enhanced 
protection of constitutional values necessarily reduces the statute's 
policy-effectiveness relative to the original. The reason is that the 
new legislation will incorporate rules directed by the courts, and 
rules are inevitably overinclusive with respect to their purposes.86 
Overinclusiveness means that the new statute will inhibit the 
accomplishment of the valid goals the legislature seeks to advance, 
and not merely the accomplishment of those goals when doing so 
would directly impair constitutional values. 
Statutes authorizing searches provide a good example. Suppose 
a court finds that a statute authorizing a search for evidence of 
terrorist activities sets the standard for conducting such searches 
too low. The legislature responds by enacting a statute that 
requires evidence prior to the search of the sort the court thought 
necessary. We can assume that in many cases, perhaps even the 
vast majority, diligent work by investigators can produce that 
evidence, and the searches will occur. It may seem that the court 
has protected civil liberties at no cost to law enforcement, because 
investigators get authorization to search every time they ask. That 
appearance is misleading. The extra effort the investigators make 
to satisfY the new statute's requirements-that is, the court's 
requirements-is effort that might have been devoted to other 
investigations. In short, law enforcement is impaired by searches 
forgone because of the time and effort spent in complying with the 
court's requirements. 
This point is quite general. Statutes pursue a complex set of 
goals, including substantive goals like law enforcement and cost-
related goals like catching crooks at a level of expense the public 
finds acceptable. Any change in a statute amounts to a change in 
the goals the statute pursues. Judicial interpretations to which 
legislatures respond by changing their statutes also change the mix 
of public policies the legislature seeks. Such interpretations have 
the policy effects associated with strong-form judicial review. 
Perhaps these policy effects could be avoided by enacting a new 
statute. But, apart from the fact that the legislature has already 
enacted the statute that in its view best accommodates 
constitutional values and non-constitutional policies, doing so faces 
86. They are also inevitably underinclusive, but underinclusiveness does 
not impair the policy goals initially sought by the legislature. 
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two additional problems. First, consider the interpretive 
instructions in the new Commonwealth model of judicial review. As 
noted earlier, courts acting pursuant to these interpretive 
instructions change the policy goals effectively implemented by a 
statute's plain language, to ensure that the statute complies with 
constitutional norms. They say, "This statute must be taken to 
mean the following, because otherwise it would violate 
constitutional norms." How can a legislature respond? Of course it 
can modify the statute, but suppose it disagrees with the courts' 
assessment of what the constitutional norms require. The only 
response, it would seem, would be to reenact the statute, perhaps 
with a new provision saying so, pretty much in terms like, "And we 
really mean it!" Such a response seems to me quite unlikely, and 
might even be ineffective because the statute as initially enacted 
should have been taken by the courts in the first place as expressing 
the legislature's policy goals. 
Second, enacting a new statute requires the expenditure of 
political resources. Even if the government gets exactly what it 
wants in the new statute, doing so takes time away from pursuing 
other legislative initiatives. Something falls off the bottom of the 
agenda when the government has to put re-enacting the statute on 
the agenda. That is a real cost to social policy, albeit one quite 
difficult to observe. 
The British Human Rights Act 1998 might escalate into strong-
form judicial review for another reason-its insertion into a legal 
system in which British statutes are subject to review by the 
European Court on Human Rights ("European Court"). The 
conventional wisdom is that Parliament will respond to a judicial 
declaration of incompatibility by modifying the challenged statute, 
and one of the reasons given is that Parliament would not want to 
be embarrassed by a decision from the European Court confirming 
the British courts' assessment. 
That reason is probably a good one, but why it is is not as 
obvious as it might seem. After all, the British courts' 
determination is only a prediction about what the European Court 
would do if it got hold of the statute. Parliament might disagree 
with the British courts' prediction, in which case it ought to be 
willing to take its chances on an appeal to Strasbourg. 
The structure of European human rights law might make the 
British courts' predictive judgments self-fulfilling, in which case 
their declarations of incompatibility would be the equivalent of 
exercises of strong-form judicial review. The reason is that 
European human rights law assesses whether a signatory's law is 
consistent with the European Convention by applying a "margin of 
appreciation." The "margin of appreciation" doctrine responds to the 
HeinOnline -- 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 837 2003
2003] NEW FORMS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 837 
observation that the signatories have different policy preferences, 
face different problems, and have different values that intersect 
with more general human rights norms even if those values are not 
inconsistent with such norms. The "margin of appreciation" 
doctrine gives some deference to a government's claim that the 
statute at issue should be taken to be consistent with the 
Convention once the European Court considers the nation's 
distinctive circumstances and characteristics.87 
The "margin of appreciation" doctrine might make a British 
court's determination that a statute is inconsistent with the 
Convention self-fulfilling, because it might well affect the degree of 
deference the European Court is willing to give to a claim by the 
British executive branch that its statute responds to something 
special about Britain. After all, the European Court will have 
available to it a determination by a British institution that the 
statute violates the Convention. That gives the European Court a 
choice between British institutions to which it might defer, and, 
courts being courts, one can fairly expect the European Court to 
respect the British courts more than it will respect the British 
executive. 
I should emphasize that I have sketched reasons and processes 
by which weak-form judicial review might escalate into strong-form 
review. But, as the section on the degeneration of weak-form review 
into parliamentary supremacy indicates, there is nothing inevitable 
here. We need more experience with weak-form systems before we 
can arrive at a judgment with any degree of confidence that 
compares them to weak-form systems.88 
V. CONCLUSION 
Weak-form systems of judicial review are intriguing. With the 
demise of parliamentary supremacy as a system constitutionalists 
are willing to defend forcefully, weak-form judicial review provides 
constitution designers a new choice within the universe of 
constrained parliamentarism. I have suggested here some reasons 
for thinking that weak-form systems of judicial review might not 
provide a permanent resolution of the worry that unconstrained 
87. The degree of deference varies; the "margin of appreciation" will be 
smaller if the human rights norm invoked has been given a specification that 
has received nearly universal acceptance within Europe. 
88. I should note, though, my judgment that we have enough experience 
with the Canadian system to conclude that it is much closer to a strong-form 
system than the most avid defenders of the section 33 process believe, even 
taking into account the supposed contributions weak-form review makes to 
dialogues between courts and legislatures. 
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parliamentarism is insufficiently attentive to human rights, or of 
the worry that strong-form systems of judicial review are in tension 
with the values of democratic self-governance. Still, thinking about 
weak-form systems is certainly more interesting than reproducing 
the discussion of judicial activism and restraint in the context of 
new institutions. Perhaps weak-form systems of judicial review 
provide more in the way of academic interest than they contribute to 
solving practical problems of governance.89 An academic will not 
take that as a criticism of weak-form judicial review. 
89. My view is that constitution-designers should spend less time tinkering 
with institutions of judicial review and more time in thinking through the ways 
in which legislatures might be structured internally to respond to the 
constraints properly placed on democratic decision-making, and concomitantly 
the ways in which a political culture might assist citizens and legislators in 
internalizing those constraints. 
